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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18239 
This is an action to construe a farm liability policy issued 
by the Appellant Insurance Company to the Respondents as farmers. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was decided in the lower court on November 24, 1981 
when the Court granted Defendants/Respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiff/Appellant made objections to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but said objections were 
denied by the Court on February 1, 1982. The lower court ruled that 
a vehicle owned by Defendants and used by Defendants.to feed their 
cattle, which was involved in a automobile accident on a public 
highway, was not an automobile under the insurance policy and 
therefore was not excluded from coverage. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's granting of 
Sunnnary Judgment against it and entry of Summary Judgment in its 
favor or remand of the case to the lower court for trial on the 
merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At all times relevant to this matter, Defendants/Respondents 
owned and operated a farm North of Mona, Utah. Approximately 
eleven years ago, Defendants purchased a two ton Ford Truck chasis 
in Spanish Fork, Utah. Thereafter, Defendants purchased a Gehl feeder 
box, to be used in spreading feed for cattle, and attached that box 
to the truck chasis. This feeder truck was thereafter used on a 
year round basis for feeding cattle until it was involved in a 
fatal traffic accident on February 6, 1980. 
The feeder truck was not registered nor did it receive a 
state safety inspection during this period of time. (Deposition 
of Orville Andrews, p. 21) Prior to the winter of 1979/1980, the 
feeder truck was used primarily on property around the farmhouse 
to haul feed to Defendants' cattle. (Deposition of Orville Andrews, 
p. 15) However, during the four to six weeks prior to the accident 
of February 6, 1980, Defendants used the feeder truck to haul feed 
to cattle located on property rented by Defendants which was 
approximately 5 1/2 miles from Defendants' farm, resulting in a 
daily round trip of eleven miles on the public highway. (Ibid. pp. 12:: 
The Farmer Liability Policy, which is the subject of this 
action, was obtained by the Defendants from Plaintiff in the early 
1970's and was merely renewed annually thereafter. Neither at the 
time of the original purchase of the said policy nor later did 
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Defendants ever inform Plaintiff or its agent that the feeder truck 
would be used on the public highway. (Deposition of Neldon Andrews, 
p. 23) 
As of February 6, 1980, Defendants owned four two-ton trucks, 
two of which were registered and two of which were not. The two 
which were registered and licensed were used to haul feed, grain 
and silage into the pit and to haul livestock to market on the 
public highways on a weekly basis. (Deposition of Orville Andrews, 
p. 24) These same two trucks were listed on the vehicle schedule 
of the automobile portion of the subject insurance policy. Of the 
two trucks that were not registered, one was a manure spreader, used 
by Defendants to spread manure on their fields in the spring, and 
the other was the subject feeder truck, neither of which were listed 
on the vehicle schedule of the subject insurance policy, because 
Defendants considered both to be just like the other farm machinery. 
(Deposition of Orville Andrews, p. 24'and Deposition of Neldon 
Andrews, pp. 12, 23) 
On February 6, 1980, at approximately 11:15 a.m., approximately 
two to three miles from Defendants' farm, Defendant/Appellant, Neldon 
Andrews, was driving the loaded feeder truck South on Old U.S. 91, 
on his way to the daily feeding of the cattle on the rented property, 
when said Defendant/Appellant applied his brakes to avoid hitting a 
dog in the road. (Deposition of Neldon Andrews, pp. 5 and 6) 
The brakes on the feeder truck locked, pulling the truck to the 
left of the center line of the highway, into the path of an on-
coming pick-up truck. A collision resulted, causing personal 
injuries and property damages. 
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At the time of the said accident, the subject insurance 
policy, No. 25000-38, was in effect and contained the following 
exclusion, located on page 3, thereof: 
"This policy a~reement does not apply: 
2. Under c~verages Fl (Bodily Injury 
Liability), F (Premises Medical), G 
(Property Damage Liability, H (Employer's 
Liability), I (Medical Payments--Employee), 
or J (Medical Payments--Named Persons) to 
bodily injury or property damage arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance, opera-
tion, or use, loading, or unloading of: 
b. Any automobile owned or operated 
~ or rented or loaned to any insured. 
But this subsection (b) does not apply 
to bodily injury or property damage 
occurring on the insured premises if 
the motor vehicle is not subJect to 
motor vehicle registration, because 
it is used exclusively on the insured 
premises." (Emphasis added) 
That policy defines "automobile ", on page 1 thereof, as 
follows: 
"Automobile means a land motor vehicle, trailer, 
or semi-trailer, but the word automobile does not 
include any crawler or farm-type tractor, farm 
implement and, if not subject to motor vehICie 
re istration, an e ui ment, which is desi ned 
for use principally o public Emp asis added) 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE SUBJECT FEEDER TRUCK WAS NOT AN AUTO-
MOBILE UNDER THE FARM LIABILITY POLICY, 
AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT SINCE, THOUGH 
IT WAS BEING USED IN THE FARMING OPERATION, 
IT WAS BEING DRIVEN UPON THE PUBLIC HIGH-
WAYS EXTENSIVELY AND THUS, ANY DAMAGES OR 
INJURIES CAUSED BY ITS USE AWAY FROM THE 
FARM PREMISES, WOULD NOT BE COVERED BY THE 
FARM POLICY .. 
The net effect of the first of the above-quoted policy 
provisions, is that the policy does not cover damages or injuries 
occurring away from the farm premises and resulting from the opera-
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tion or use of an "automobile". The net effect of the second 
provision, quoted above, is to define an "automobile" under the 
subject policy. This Brief is directed at that second provision, 
which defines an "automobile" as a land motor vehicle, trailer, 
or semi-trailer, with three exceptions. Since there can be no 
question that Defendants/Respondents' feeder truck was a land 
motor vehicle, the following discussion is focused on those three 
exceptions. 
1. Is Defendants' feeder truck a crawler or farm-type 
tractor? Common sense would exclude the truck as a crawler, 
since it is a truck with a conventional drive train and .wheels, 
that can be driven on highways, at highways speeds. As to whether 
it is a farm-type tractor, Section 41-1-l(e), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, defines "farm tractor" as "every motor vehicle 
designed and used primarily as farm implement for drawing plows, 
mowing machines, and other implements of husbandry." This defini-
tion would exc.lude Defendants/Respondents' feeder truck because 
it is not designed or used to draw or pull things, but rather to 
transport and spread chopped hay. 
In the case of State vs. Thompson, 101 So.2d 381, 386 (Fla. 
1958), the Florida Supreme Court was called on to determine 
whether trucks used in farming operations on the farm premises the 
majority of the time, but used on the highways incidentally to 
the farming operations, were farm tractors entitled to special 
licensing fees. That court defined "farm tractor" as: 
"merely a tractor used in connection with 
farm and grove pursuits, i~ i? no~ ~ load-
carrying truck to be used indiscriminately 
over the highways of the state, merely 
-5-
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because it may be used on a farm 51% 
of its operational or mileage time." 
The statutory definition cited above as well as the definition 
supplied by the Florida Supreme Court, quoted above, would give 
the term "farm tractor" its common meaning, and would exclude 
from that term a truck such as Defendants/Respondents' feeder truck, 
which was designed and used to haul chopped hay. 
2. Is the feeder truck a farm implement? The feeder 
truck was used as a vehicle to transport and spread chopped hay 
for Defendants/Respondents' cattle. For over a month prior to 
the accident on February 6, 1980, the said feeder truck was being 
driven on the public roads at least eleven miles per day, six days 
per week. While on the farm premises and engaged in farming 
operations, the feeder truck was a farm implement, but when the 
feeder truck was using the public highways to transport feed to 
cattle 5 1/2 miles from Defendants/Respondents' farm, the feeder 
truck was a transport vehicle merely engaged in farming operations. 
In 7 Am Jur 2d 768 (Automobile Insurance, Section 229), it 
states: 
"It sometimes has been held that a particular 
vehicle may fall within a policy coverage, as 
an automobile or motor vehicle, while engaged 
in one activity and be excluded while engaged 
in another. A vehicle may be a motor vehicle 
while traveling on the highway, but not while 
engaged in off-highway activities." 
This is true in regard to the subject feeder truck, which lost its 
identity as a farm implement when it used the public highways in 
its eleven mile trip to ~aul feed to Defendants/Respondents' cattle. 
-6-
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In Nepstad vs. Randall, 82 S.D. 615, 152 N.W. 2d 383, (1967), 
the South Dakota Supreme Court determined that a motor driven golf 
cart operated on a golf course was not a "motor vehicle", but when 
the same cart was operated on the public highway to transport 
persons or property, it was a "motor vehicle". 
In Mission Insurance Company vs. Nethers, 119 Ariz. 405, 
581 P.2d 250, 253 (1978), the court stated: 
"Exclusions in an insurance contract are 
strictly construed in favor of the insured 
and coverage against the insurer .... 
Even so, they must be construed in a 
reasonable manner and given ordinary meaning 
and effect to the terms used therein." 
The reasonable interpretation of the term "farm implement" would 
surely include the subject feeder truck while it was being used on 
the farm premises, but the same term would not reasonably include 
the feeder truck when it was being used extensively on the public 
highways traveling at highway speeds and in traffic. 
And again as stated in Kansas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company vs. Cool, 205 Kan. 567, 471 P.2d 352, 357 (1970), "The 
manner in which a vehicle is used, as well as its construction, is 
an important factor in determining its character." The highway use 
of the feeder truck should affect its definition and character as 
a farm implement. 
In the case of Washington National Insurance Co. vs. Burke, 
258 S.W. 2d 709, 710 (Kentucky Court of Appeals, 1953), the court 
stated, "With all the liberality of construction in favor of the 
insured, in the quest for the intention of the parties, regard must 
necessarily be had for the fact that a small_premium was payable." 
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The Defendants/Respondents, made the choice not to list the feeder 
truck on the vehicle schedule of the automobile portion of the 
subject insurance policy, and rather viewed the feeder truck as 
farm machinery. By so doing, Defendants/Repondents' insurance 
premium was reduced, since the rating for a vehicle used on the 
farm premises would be significantly less than a vehicle used on 
the highways becasue of reduced speed, traffic, and likelihood 
of accidents. The smaller premium was certainly an indication to 
the Defendants/Respondents that the coverage on the feeder truck 
was limited. Based on that reasoning, Defendants/Respondents 
should not be allowed to maintain their position that the subject 
feeder truck. while being used extensively on the public highway, 
was a farm implement. 
3. Is the feeder truck subject to motor vehicle registration, 
and if not, is it designed for use principally off public roads? 
As to whether the subject feeder truck was subject to registration, 
Section 41-1-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, requires 
that every motor vehicle be registered when driven or moved on a 
highway, with certain listed exceptions. Subsection (c) of the 
above-mentioned section, is the only exception which possibly applies 
to Defendants/Respondents' feeder truck. This subsection excepts 
from registration "any implement of husbandry, whether of a type 
otherwise subject to registration hereunder or not, which is only 
incidentally operated or moved upon a highway;". However, this 
subsection is inapplicable when considering the highway use 
Defendants/Respondents made of the feeder truck, because the truck 
was operated upon the highways at least eleven miles per day, six 
days per week, which does not qualify as incidental operation 
-8-
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or movement upon the highways. In the case of Allred vs. Engelman, 
123 Tx. 205, 61 S.W. 2d 75, (1933), the Texas Supreme Court found 
that farm vehicles traveling an average of one-fourth of a mile 
on public roads running through and enclosed within a single track 
of land were only temporarily and incidentally using the highways. 
In the present action, there are two pieces of property separated 
by 5 1/2 miles of public road which is transversed twice daily 
by the subject feeder truck. This is not incidental operation 
or movement upon the highways. Because the feeder truck does not 
qualify under any of the exceptions to the above-cited statute, the 
law requires that it be registered. 
Should this Court determine that the feeder truck was sub-
ject to the registration requirements, the second part of question 
No. 3 need not be pursued. However, if it is determined that 
the feeder truck was not subject to registration requirements, 
an examination must be made as to whether the feeder truck was 
designed for use principally off public roads. In the case of 
Terrace Park, Inc. vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 84 S.D. 259, 
i70 N.W.2d 467, 468 (1969), the court stated: "The word 'designed' 
has been defined as 'appropriate, fit, prepared, or suitable' and 
also as 'adaptable, designated, or intended'." As demonstrated by 
the Defendants/Respondents during the 6 weeks prior to February 
7, 1980, the feeder truck was in fact appropriate and adapted 
to be used principally on public roads. During that time, the majority 
of its operational mileage was registered over the public highways. The 
Ford chasis on which the feeder box was attached, was designed for and 
-9-
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capable of use on public roadways. The addition of the feeder box 
did not alter that design or capability. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants/Respondents' feeder truck is an "automobile" 
within the scope of the subject insurance policy, since it is 
a land motor vehicle, and it.is not a crawler or farm-type tractor, 
farm implement or, if not subject to motor vehicle registration, 
equipment which is designed for use principally off public roads. 
When the feeder truck was used as a farm implement or 
equipment on the farm, and only incidentally on the public highway, 
it was covered under the subject insurance policy. Under these 
circumstances, there was little risk and thus an appropriately 
small premium was charged to cover that limited risk. However, 
when the feeder truck was used as a land motor vehicle on the public 
highway, as it was at the time of the accident and for six weeks 
prior thereto, traveling some eleven miles per day on the public 
highway, it became subject to motor vehicle registration, it be-
came an "automobile", as defined in the subject insurance policy, 
and it was not covered under the subject insurance policy. Under 
such circumstances, the risk greatly increased and thus an appro-
priately larger premium was chargeable in order to cover the greater 
risk. However, when the Defendants/Respondents changed the use 
of the feeder truck from a farm implement to a land motor vehicle, 
no notice was given to Plaintiff/Appellant, and thus Plaintiff/ 
Appellant had no opportunity to decide whether or not to insure the 
feeder truck under the automobile policy and if so, what amount of 
premium to charge. At the time of the accident, the feeder truck 
was not covered under the farm liability policy nor was it listed 
-10-
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as an insured vehicle under the automobile liability policy. Thus, 
there was no coverage, and the insurer would not have _covered it. 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court erred in 
finding that the subject vehicle was not an "automobile" and this 
Court should reverse that decision and enter Summary Judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff/Appellant on the issue that the subject feeder 
tru~k was an automobile and damages arising from the use thereof 
away from the farm premises was excluded from the subject policy. 
DATED this 28th day of May, 1982. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, to Mr. R.C. Skeen, 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, Suite 1600, 50 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, and to Mr. Ray H. Ivie, 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, 48 North University Avenue, 
Provo, Utah 84601, on this 28th day of May, 1982. 
-11-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
